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Abstract—Network intrusion detection systems and antivirus 
software are essential in detecting malicious network traffic and 
attacks such as denial-of-service and malwares. Each attack, 
worm or virus has its own distinctive signature. Signature-based 
intrusion detection and antivirus systems depend on pattern 
matching to look for possible attack signatures. Pattern matching 
is a very complex task, which requires a lot of time, memory and 
computing resources. Software-based intrusion detection is not 
fast enough to match high network speeds and the increasing 
number of attacks. In this paper, we propose special purpose 
hardware for Wu-Manber pattern matching algorithm. FPGAs 
form an excellent choice because of their massively parallel 
structure, reprogrammable logic and memory resources. The 
hardware is designed in Verilog and implemented using Xilinx 
ISE. For evaluation, we dope network traffic traces collected 
using Wireshark with 2500 signatures from the ClamAV virus 
definitions database. Experimental results show high speed that 
reaches up to 216 Mbps. In addition, we evaluate time, device 
usage, and power consumption. 
Keywords— Network Security; Intrusion Detection; Pattern 
Matching; Anti-Malware; ClamAV. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, information technology and computers play an 
essential role in all aspects of our lives. A gargantuan amount 
of digital data is produced in social, personal, multimedia, 
government, business and scientific domains. Therefore, the 
storage, maintenance, analytics and safeguarding of such data 
against intrusions had become an important research topic. 
Intrusion detection systems and antivirus software help protect 
the data at the edge of the network and end device, 
respectively. 
Network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is essential in 
detecting malicious network traffic. Based on the approach, 
there are two categories: anomaly and signature-based. 
Anomaly works by detecting any behavior deviating from the 
baseline. The baseline is a profile capturing normal activities 
of a computer system or network [1]. 
Anomaly-based have self-learning capabilities. The system 
administrator trains the system to recognize the baseline. The 
normal state of the network's traffic is defined using 
parameters such as: payload, packet size, and protocol. After 
training finishes, the anomaly-based system monitors network 
and compares its state with the normal baseline to detect 
anomalies. This approach is effective in capturing new attacks 
and behaviors, however it generates many false positives and 
negatives [2]. 
Signature-based NIDS, also called misuse-based, relies on 
a set of rules to define suspicious activities. Those rules are 
applied to all incoming and outgoing traffic. Rules define 
several parameters that identify the suspicious activity such as 
the packet type, a signature string to match against the traffic, 
a location where the signature might be, and a type of action to 
take if the packet is deemed malicious. Rules come in several 
forms depending on the particular system [3]. In summary, 
signature-based NIDS simply searches the data for exact 
signatures. The existence of those signatures means with 
100% certainty that the packet or data contains an attack or 
malware. Signature-based NIDS remains the most commonly 
used up to date because of their accuracy and superior speed 
[4]. 
Both anomaly or signature systems need to monitor the 
network packets in real-time, either by comparing patterns or 
by finding out-of-ordinary behavior [5]. Signature-based 
mostly depends on a pattern matching algorithm to perform 
the core matching process. Pattern matching is a very complex 
and time-consuming task, because it happens at the ever-
increasing network speed and against the increasing number of 
malware or attack definitions. Software-based NIDS running 
on general purpose hardware are not fast enough to deal with 
the high network speeds and the increasing number of attacks. 
Therefore, NIDS require dedicated hardware that is designed 
specifically for this critical and challenging task [6]. 
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are arrays of 
programmable logic that can be configured to perform any 
computational task. They are excellent candidate for fast 
matching against large patterns because they are a large array 
structure of configurable logic, arithmetic, and memory blocks 
that can work on many tasks at the same time. FPGAs are re-
programmable, which makes it easier to accommodate new 
attack and malware signatures. Moreover, hardware upgrades 
and bug fixes can be as easy as fixing a software [7].  
In this paper, we propose a hardware specific Wu-Manber 
algorithm. We implement it on FPGA to speed up 
NIDS/antivirus. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 explains pattern matching and Wu-Manber 
algorithm. Section 3 provides a critical analysis of the related 
 work. The proposed hardware design is explained in Section 4. 
Section 5 covers evaluation and analysis of bit rate, time, 
device usage, and power. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section sheds more light on Snort NIDS and ClamAV 
antivirus. It also describes pattern matching and explains the 
inner workings of Wu-Manber. 
A. Snort Intrusion Detection System 
Signature-based NIDSs were developed to search network 
traffic for predefined attack patterns. Snort is popular open 
source, NIDS acquired by CISCO [8]. Snort comes with all 
sorts of built-in rule files. The rule files are ASCII coded text 
files with each line representing a rule. Figure 1 shows Snort 
rule format and gives a real example. Snort rule with sid 
2002383 alerts the system administrator of a potential FTP 
brute-force login scan attempt. If an outgoing tcp packet from 
port 21 (ftp) contains the signature “530”, ftp code for failed 
login. 
B. ClamAV Anivirus 
Antivirus software protects networks and clients from 
malwares. ClamAV is a very popular open source antivirus 
available under General Public License (GPL) [9-11]. It has its 
own proprietary format for virus definitions: ClamAV Virus 
Database (.CVD) files. ClamAV comes with two files: 
main.cvd and daily.cvd, that are updated automatically. Those 
.CVD files have a text based 512 bytes header with colon 
separated fields. The signatures can be opened and extracted 
using the provided command line sigtool. 
C. Pattern Matching 
Pattern matching is one of the most fundamental 
operations in computer transactions from search to pattern 
recognition and bioinformatics [12]. It is an essential and 
critical part of many applications including search engines, 
anti-malware, antivirus, spam filters, and intrusion detection 
and prevention systems. Therefore, there is a great need for 
fast and efficient pattern matching [13]. 
Pattern matching algorithms can be divided into two main 
categories depending on the approach: exact and approximate 
pattern matching. In exact pattern matching, all characters of 
the pattern must exist in the search string to declare a 
successful match. This type of algorithms is more prevalent in 
anti-malware, antiviruses and intrusion detection systems. In 
approximate pattern matching, a match is successful if a string 
similar to the given pattern is found. That is inexact match, 
where the pattern found differs by k characters, called edit 
distance, from the required signature. This type of algorithms 
is used in SPAM filtering systems and information retrieval 
[14]. 
There exists many pattern matching algorithms, and 
several of them have been used by intrusion detection systems. 
The most popular algorithms include: Knuth-Morris-Pratt 
(KMP) [15], Boyer-Moore (BM) [16], Aho-Corasick (AC) 
[17], and Wu-Manber (WM) [18]. Each has advantages and 
disadvantages making them either attractive or less attractive 
choice for NIDS. KMP and BM fall into the single pattern 
matching category. Hence, we must examine the packet once 
for each attack signature, which is highly inefficient for NIDS. 
On the other hand, AC and WM are multi-pattern matching 
algorithms, in that they match all signatures against all packets 
in one sweep. They add a preprocessing stage, where all 
signatures are built into either hash tables in WM or a trie in 
AC. Both have been used by Snort [8]. However, WM has 
proven to be more efficient, for longer signatures, than AC. 
Additionally, adding new signatures in WM is much easier 
than AC, which requires rebuilding the finite state machine 
[19]. 
D. Wu-Manber Algorithm 
Wu-Manber algorithm is based on the basic principles of 
Boyer-Moore, but uses a block of size B instead of one 
character [20]. WM builds two main tables: shift and hash. 
The shift table contains the number of characters to skip 
forward in the case of a mismatch based on BM bad character 
heuristic. In the case of a probable match the hash table is 
searched. WM calculates the hash value of the suffix block of 
characters from the signatures. It is recommended by Wu and 
Manber that WM block size, B, be 2 or 3. The size of 
matching window is dictated by the length of the shortest 
signature.  
WM has preprocessing and search stages [21]. Before any 
search takes place, the signatures must be preprocessed. 
1) Preprocessing stage 
Preprocessing has two steps: first, the algorithm 
determines the size of the matching window, and second it 
builds the shift and hash tables. WM stores the shift forward 
distance of the character block in the shift table. Furthermore, 
it stores the entry of the linked list that contains all patterns 
with the same suffix in the hash table [22]. For example, if we 
have a pattern set P = {P1, P2, …, Pk} and text to search T, of 
length n, and a match window of size m, and B=2, then the 
shift table is constructed as follows. The shift value for any 
block x located within the current matching window is: 
 
Where, q is the rightmost place x occurred in any of the 
patterns. If the shift for a block is zero then all patterns 
containing x are inserted as a linked list in the hash table. 
 
Fig. 1. Snort rule format and example 
 
[Action][Protocol][SourceIP/Mask][SourcePort]à 
[DestinationIP/Mask][DestinationPort][Options] 
  
alert tcp $HOME_NET 21 à  $EXTERNAL_NET any  
(msg:"ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt"; 
content:"530 "; pcre:"/530\s+(Login|User|Failed| 
Not)/smi"; sid:2002383; rev:10; 
  
 2) Search stage 
To search through a packet, a sliding window is shifted 
forward. Keeping in mind that the WM block size, B=2, WM 
search works as follows. WM hashes the last two characters of 
the current sliding window. The hash value is the index to 
access the shift table. If the shift was >0, the sliding window 
is shifted forward and the process repeats. If the shift was 
zero, this means that the examined block is a suffix of at least 
one of the patterns. In this case, WM checks the hash table, 
using the same index used to access the shift table, to search 
the linked list for the patterns with the same suffix. Those 
patterns are then matched one by one. After the match process 
finishes, the search pointer is incremented by one if no match 
is detected, or incremented by the size of detected pattern and 
the process repeats. 
III. RELATED WORK 
There had been a lot of efforts to speedup pattern matching 
in hardware dating back to the 1990’s [23]. Cho, Navab and 
Mangione [3] proposed a parallel rule-based inspection 
firewall that processed each rule separately. Data packet is 
passed to the parallel rule units that compare headers against 
predefined header data. If a match is found, it passed the 
payload data to the content pattern match unit. The content 
pattern match unit had four 8-bit comparators to increase the 
throughput. It was tested using Snort signatures and achieved 
over 2.88 Gbps on an Altera EP20K with operating frequency 
of 90 MHz. Ten logic cells are required per search pattern. 
One of our most recent efforts was a GPU-based 
accelerator for Myers algorithm. It parallelized the bit-vector 
approximate matching algorithm, on a multi-core CPU under 
the MapReduce framework. MAPCG achieved more than 4.5 
times speedup over the serial version for normal network 
traffic. However, the memory overhead was high reaching 
over 2 GB [4]. 
Fang, Katz, and Lakshman [24] implemented an IDS 
scheme that deeply analyzed the intruder’s signatures and 
categorized them into: simple, complex and correlated 
patterns. The authors use TCAMs to store patterns due its 
benefits in compressing contents size and implementing 
wildcards. The scheme consisted of static RAM memory used 
as partial hit list (PHL). According to the simulation, this 
scheme operated at 2 Gbps when matching with 240kB 
TCAM containing 1768 ClamAV signatures. The 
disadvantage is when the intruder intentionally sends packets, 
that PHL access rate will be very high, which affected the 
system throughput. 
Tan and Sherwood [25] proposed a high throughput string 
matching architecture. They modified AC using bit-split 
parallelism by creating eight parallel smaller FSMs, one per 
bit.  One of the advantages was that the signatures may be 
added without interrupting operation. They claimed they could 
build a 10 times faster system. However, they cannot expand 
beyond eight parallel instances.  
Alicherry, Muthiprasanna and Kumar [26] proposed a 
high-speed pattern matching system that extends AC 
algorithm to make it capable of processing multiple characters 
at a time. In addition, they used TCAM to construct 
compressed AC DFA. The compressed DFA had multiple 
character transitions to achieve multi-gigabit rate search 
speed. Salour and Su [27] on the other hand proposed a 
dynamic two-layer signature based NIDS with unequal 
databases. They divided the signatures into two databases: 
small one containing common attacks, and the other database 
containing all remaining signatures. The system automatically 
decided, which database it should use: the small efficient 
database to improve the detection speed, or the 
complementary less than ideal large database. 
Kharbutli, Aldwairi, and Mughrabi [28] proposed three 
novel Wu-Manber parallelism approaches: shared position, 
trace distribution and a combination of both. In shared 
position algorithm, several parallel scanning windows each 
working on different processors. All scanning windows shared 
the highest scanned position in the string that one of the 
scanning windows resided on. On the other hand, trace 
distribution algorithm, is regular data parallelism that 
distributed the network traces over multiple processing units. 
The disadvantage of this algorithm is that it needed prior 
knowledge of the dataset size. The third algorithm combined 
the two solutions by using multiple scanning windows over 
segmented dataset. They used Snort signatures and showed 
about 2 times speedup relative to serial implementation of 
Wu-Manber. 
Themistoklis, Charalampos and Konstantinos [29] 
implemented WM algorithm using OpenCL Framework. The 
goal was to increase the performance of the GPUs when 
locating nucleotides and amino acid sequence patterns within 
biological databases. The experimental results showed a 
significant speedup of about 31 times for the best case, and 
about 2 times for the worst case. Maier [30] implemented 
Rabin-Karp algorithm on FPGAs. In preprocessing stage, the 
system hashed all patterns, which supported finite number of 
different patterns lengths because separate text hash must be 
calculated for every pattern length. They used Xilinx Virtex II 
and IV FPGAs and were able only to support 300 and 1500 
patterns respectively. Unfortunately, those patterns are not 
enough and Rabin-Karp algorithm allows false positives. 
Rafla and Gauba [31] introduced FSM-based hardware 
with embedded softcore processor MicroBlaze. The FSM can 
be reconfigured on-the-fly by altering the memory contents 
without performing place-and-route process. KMP [15], which 
is a single pattern matching algorithm, was used! The 
MicroBlaze accepted new patterns from the host system via 
HyperTerminal and a C program computed the prefix array. 
Then the MicroBlaze processor reconfigured the FSM by 
updating state transition and output vector tables according to 
the new prefix array. The results showed increased 
performance, however, the number of blocks needed to match 
a pattern within a text is equal to the length of the text plus the 
length of the pattern. 
IV. HARDWARE FOR PATTERN MATCHING 
Wu-Manber algorithm is hash table based, which makes it 
suitable for FPGAs. The input text enters the system through 
the LAN interface module (LI). The Patterns Buffer (PB) 
 module passes the patterns to the preprocessing stage to obtain 
the hash and shift values for the pattern pieces. The Pattern 
Shifter module (PS) finishes the preprocessing by creating the 
shift and hash tables. The hardware is now ready to receive the 
packets through the data stream to match against the patterns. 
The search is handled by the Pattern Matching module (PM), 
which matches input stream with the programmed patterns in 
the PB. The controller module (CM) controls all data paths, 
multiplexers, registers and control signals of all modules. 
A. Pattern Matching Module 
PThe PM module performs the actual matching by taking 
input stream into buffer called Shift Buffer. It then searches 
for possible edges by tracking the two bytes residing at the 
locations away from the end of the buffer by ML and ML–1 as 
shown by Figure 2. Next, it retrieves the shift value of the two 
bytes’ block from the shift table. If an edge is detected, the 
PM retrieves the desired pattern from patterns buffer and 
stores it in the match buffer to start matching between the two 
buffers. 
Because the shift table can grow very large, the shift value 
retrieval for each block is expensive. A Bloom filter (BF) is 
used. It has a hash function circuit to compute a hash for each 
byte-pair. In preprocessing, when the PS computes a shift 
value for a byte-pair, the BF computes the hash value of the 
pair and sets the corresponding bit in the BF vector register. In 
matching, the BF is used to determine if the byte-pair does not 
have a shift in the table. If the BF bit is 1 then, the shift value 
is read from the table. Otherwise, the maximum shift is used. 
B. Pattern Buffer 
The PB holds the patterns to match against, segmented into 
64-bit words. The last word of the pattern is padded with 
zeros. The internal buffer is 65-bit wide, with 1 bit flag used to 
mark the last word. The internal buffer is addressed by the 32-
bit Address Register (AD). All patterns with same byte-pair 
ending are stored next to each other in the buffer. This will 
make the PB each segment holds many patterns with same 
suffix [32] 
C. Hash Table 
Hash table is a memory with 128k words, 32-bit each. It 
holds the start and end addresses of the PB segment holding 
the patterns for the same byte-pair suffix. The first half is for 
end addresses and the second is for start addresses. For 
example, HASH[1AA] is the start address of the PB segment 
that contains patterns that have patterns substrings of length 
ML and ending with “AA”. HASH[0AA] is the end address of 
the same segment. At the preprocessing stage, when reaching 
the pattern’s end, the address of the first word of the pattern 
set with the same ending is stored in the buffer, and the 
number of locations that the pattern holds in the PB is passed 
to HT through the 8-bit Bus1. Using this information, the HT 
computes the end address of the segment. When there is 
another pattern ending with same byte-pair, the HT uses Hash 
Count to compute the new end address of the pattern segment. 
The HT is an FSM with 7 states as shown by Figure. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 2. PM buffers. 
 
Fig. 3. Hash table module. 
D. Shift Table 
The Shift Table (ST) consists of 64k byte memory that is 
addressed by byte-pair 16-bit Bus2. It holds the shift values of 
the corresponding byte-pair. The “write” input control is used 
to program the table during preprocessing, where shift values 
from Bus1 are written to locations addressed by Bus2. If the 
“write” signal is not asserted, the ST is in the reading mode. 
The “DataReady” and “WriteDone” flags indicate the 
completion of the read or write operations. 
 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Below we present the test datasets and a full evaluation in 
terms of device utilization, timing, power and bitrates. 
A. Datasets Collection and Processing 
Two types of data were collected: the signatures from 
ClamAV [10] database, and the network traffic traces 
collected using Wireshark network protocol analyzer [33]. To 
extract the signatures from ClamAV CVD files we skipped the 
512-byte header. There are several types of signatures in 
CVD, each with its own format. Excel was used to clean the 
signatures, extract the patterns and prepare them to be stored 
in the PB module. Each pattern was divided into 64-bit pieces, 
with 1-bit “PattFlag=0” to mark the last piece.  
Excel was used to extract packet traces from the Wireshark 
output files. The cleaned trace file contains traffic frames, 
each on one line. This data must be segmented to 64-bit words 
to store them in the LI buffer. We develop a utility (FileSplit) 
to split the resultant string into lines. We collected traces of 
different traffic types: Mixed1&2 contain normal traffic such 
as browsing, video streaming, and chatting. In addition, we 
collected file download1 & 2 and RemoteControl1 & 2 traffic. 
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 To generate malicious traffic, we mix random sets of 
patterns (Set1, 2, 3 and 4) into the traces randomly to generate 
doped trace files shown in table 1. The doping percentage is 
the number of lines with patterns over the total number of 
lines in the doped file. 
B. Synthesis Results 
The design was synthesized for Virtex 5 using Xilinx ISE 
Project Navigator 14.3 and simulated using ISim. Each 
module was synthesized alone to determine the device 
utilization and the maximum speed that can be reached. 
1) Device utilization 
Pattern matching module was the largest in terms of device 
utilization with 14,000 slices from the target device. 
2) Timing analysis 
We translate, map, place and route each module several 
times until timing constraints are met. Table 2 shows 
minimum delay Post-Place and Route timing reports (PPAR). 
The maximum speed for each module is shown by Figure 4. 
Obviously, PM was the slowest module with maximum 
frequency of 239MHz. 
3) Power analysis 
The power analysis using xPower Analyzer shows 2.5W 
consumption for all main modules, except for the controller, 
which consumed 1.5W because it has no large storage 
elements. The total power of the system is 47W. 
TABLE I.  TRAFFIC TRACES AND DOPING PERCENTAGE 
File Size (kB) Doping % 
Set1Mixed1 238 39.02% 
Set2Mixed1 404 63.98% 
Set3Mixed1 147 1.66% 
Set4Mixed1 163 11.71% 
Set1Mixed2 238 39.02% 
Set2Mixed2 404 63.98% 
Set3Mixed2 147 1.66% 
Set4Mixed2 163 11.71% 
Set1FileDownload1 238 39.02% 
Set2FileDownload1 404 63.98% 
Set3FileDownload1 147 1.66% 
Set4FileDownload1 163 11.71% 
Set1FileDownload2 238 39.02% 
Set2FileDownload2 404 63.98% 
Set3FileDownload2 147 1.66% 
Set4FileDownload2 163 11.71% 
Set1RemoteControl1 238 39.02% 
Set2RemoteControl1 404 63.98% 
Set3RemoteControl1 147 1.66% 
Set4RemoteControl1 163 11.71% 
Set1RemoteControl2 238 39.02% 
Set2RemoteControl2 404 63.98% 
Set3RemoteControl2 147 1.66% 
Set4RemoteControl2 163 11.71% 
Average  
TABLE II.  TIMING RESULTS 
Module Min 
Period 
Max Frequency 
(MHz) 
Controller 2.747ns 364.033  
PM 4.184ns 239.005  
PS 2.863ns 349.284  
ST 1.999ns 500.250  
HT 1.999ns 500.250  
PB 1.999ns 500.250  
LI 3.103ns 322.269  
TABLE III.  BIT RATE VALUES AND SIMULATION TIME 
Signatures  Set1 Set2 Set3 Set4 
File 
Process-
ing 
Time  
ms 
Bit 
Rate 
Mbps 
Process-
ing 
Time 
ms 
Bit 
Rate 
Mbps 
Process-
ing 
Time  
ms 
Bit 
Rate 
Mbps 
Process-
ing 
Time  
ms 
Bit 
Rate 
Mbps 
Mixed1 13.6 63 24.3 60 7.8 68 8.7 68 
Mixed2 40.7 21 47.5 31 35.8 15 36.7 16 
FileDownload1 7.3 118 21.9 67 2.5 216 3.4 177 
FileDownload2 8.3 104 19.5 75 2.9 187 3.4 176 
RemoteControl1 12.7 68 24.9 58 8.8 61 9.3 64 
RemoteControl2 8.1 107 20.8 70 2.7 197 3.0 201 
 
 
Fig. 4. Modules’ speeds. 
C. Simulation Results 
The system was tested with 154kB patterns file containing 
a total of 2,500 patterns. The minimum length was 15 bytes 
and therefore, the maximum shift was 14 bytes. The 
simulation times taken by each trace file are shown in table 3. 
The bitrate decreased while processing the files doped with 
Set2, this is because Set2 has more patterns than other sets. In 
addition, the distribution of patterns in the same trace file 
affects the bitrate. This occurs because the implemented 
algorithm depends on skipping bytes according to shift table. 
If the distribution of patterns changed, the values of shifts 
retrieved from the shift table will differ according to the byte-
pair that the PM stopped on. If the average of shifts decreased, 
the bit rate will decrease. This issue is clear in the bitrate of 
processing Mixed2 trace file as shown in Figure 5. Even 
though Set2 contains more patterns, but when it is mixed with 
Mixed2 trace file, it results in a better bitrate than mixing 
other sets with the same trace file. Nonetheless, the bitrate was 
calculated for the total size of the doped trace files. 
 
Fig. 5. Bitrate values. 
When comparing the performance of our system to Snort, 
Spam filters’ [34] or malicious websites [35] note that 
 ClamAV has over 1.5 million signatures as opposed to Snort’s 
3,000 signatures. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Using FPGAs to implement Wu-Manber matching 
algorithm has an advantage of increasing performance. But 
this is affected by several factors. Large patterns database 
decreases the speed of the system due to many factors. First 
the large number of patterns that the system should match with 
the traffic every time the system detects a pattern suffix. 
Second the average shift value from the shift table will 
decrease due to the increment of byte pairs that reside on 
patterns suffixes. Additionally, the bit rate of the system is 
variable due to the shift value retrieved from shift table which 
depends on the signatures as well as the traces. 
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